In April 2020, and in the interest of legacy, I penned a Wikipedia entry recording the thoughts and notable achievements of myself as Harveywetdog. I admit I was ignorant of the rules concerning self promotion on Wikipedia at the time; consequently my entry was unfortunately, although arguably correctly, deleted and my account expunged from the system. As a result my original words and links were sadly lost but nevertheless here is an attempt at a rewrite. Perhaps when I'm gone someone will be able to enter it onto Wikipedia on my behalf, to serve as a fitting epitaph for the exciting times I spent on the Harveywetdog Project.
I was not present at Bicton on the day in 2024 when Georgie Campbell suffered her tragic, fatal accident due to a rotational fall at fence 5B, the Symonds and Sampson Splash. I had however been there in the run up to Sunday's competition and I had produced a short video around the water complex prior to the event.
Following the accident I published a blog on June 10th 2024 acknowledging Georgie's contribution to eventing and examining areas where I thought any investigation into the accident would want to concentrate. I summarised these as, the positioning of the water complex near the start of the course (Fence 5ABC), the downhill approach followed by a sharp turn into the sun to 5A before the horse could read the whole question, and whether or not 5B should have been frangible.
The blog describes my previous experiences of the 5ABC combination. What I didn't mention in my blog was the two previous accidents I had witnessed as horses came down the same hill and into the area of the first water at Bicton. The first in 2023, involving French rider Zazie Gardeau and Daiquiri, resulted in an extremely serious injury for the rider and regrettably proved fatal for the horse. The second, the day before Georgie's death, involved Brazilian rider Marcio Carvalho Jorge and Lilo TR and resulted in a rider injury, while this time thankfully the horse walked away.
I had great hopes for the investigation into the cause of Georgie's accident. I was working on my ethical equine safety case at the time and as you will know my Claim 2 was "an open reporting culture leads to continuous improvement". My naïve belief was that there would be an investigation, apparent causes would be fully examined leading to the identification of the root cause along with areas for improvement. Of course this is only half the story since as I spelt out in Claim 2, argument 4, lessons learned would be acted upon in a demonstrable and timely manner, with the emphasis here on demonstrable (which to me means made public).
The formal inquest into Georgie Campbell's death at Bicton took place in Exeter, at the Devon Coroner's Court on 30th April 2026. The presiding officer was Area Coroner Deborah Archer.
The record of the formal inquest is decidedly brief and amounts to no more than a page of A4. The Coroner states that the death was caused by an accident, and that Georgie died as a result of a catastrophic head injury caused after falling from her horse in a rotational fall whilst she was participating in an eventing competition.
I was not present at the inquest and do not know exactly what was said on the day. However reports in the media give us some indication of the Coroner's thinking but again I do not know if these are first hand or in response to a specific brief. The reports give us an outline of the following facts:
The course risk assessment was considered to be adequate
The rotational fall was caused by Global Quest putting in a short stride before fence 5B
Both horse and rider were suitably qualified and experienced for the course
There was nothing in the way the combination took on the first four fences to suggest anything was amiss
The rider was was wearing the appropriate safety equipment
Nothing had spooked the horse as he approached the jump
The coroner concluded that Georgie's death was "nothing but a terrible, tragic accident". We are asked to accept that the accident arose from the inherent risks of elite eventing, rather than any failings by organisers or officials.
Of course lesser mortals will leave it there; but for a baby boomer nuclear professional, trained to maintain a questioning attitude, this was never going to be sufficient. If we accept that in life accidents will happen, what is important is that we learn from them and move forward.
Lessons Learned
With that thought in mind I wrote to Rosie Williams to ask if British Eventing intended to make public any findings or reports arising from their own investigation into the fatality. Rosie replied to say that as the coroners report is a matter of public record, BE would not be publishing anything else out of respect for the family.
Unfortunately the Coroners inquest report is not a matter of public record (if you want a copy you have to request it) and neither is it a full report of the inquest (nor is it required to be). It certainly isn't a lessons learned document that the eventing community can use to go forward and possibly avoid a similar accident occurring in the future.
So what lessons could we have learned and acted upon from this terrible, tragic accident? One of the apparent causes I identified, a downhill approach on a fresh horse into an unforgiving combination, has now been removed since Fence 5ABC, as it was, no longer exists at Bicton.
We are told that the course risk assessment was considered adequate, but we are not told what it said about the risk of a rotational fall at 5B. The large log was not frangible, and without the details of the risk assessment we do not know if it could have been or if it should have been.
Speaking about the water complex in 2023, course designer Helen West explained that she "loved the wood" and had tried to achieve a natural, rustic feel around the water with big timber which she felt "always just rides very well" as it was natural to the horses and that it was "very obvious to them what the question is". This was qualified with "generally speaking it rides well" and clearly one fatal accident was felt enough to challenge this assertion and bring the rustic feel around the water complex to an end.
Helen explained that 5ABC had been required on the way down the hill in order to allow the horses to gently “get their feet wet” in readiness for the direct jump into the water over the suspended log at 7. There are two good equine strides between 5A and 5B, although this appeared to require strong riding to achieve the two strides on the video examples that I have from 2023.
Course design at Bicton has progressed further since my video in the autumn of 2024 thanks to the introduction of a third water complex at Bicton in the field at the top of the hill. This meant that in 2026 horses did not return to the lower water complex until later on in the course and with frangible fences on the approach to the water (in the classes that I watched).
What I don't know is how widely this learning has been shared or needed to be implemented elsewhere.
Other contributary factors could have been the combination's approach to water. We are told that watching the live stream there was nothing to suggest that anything was amiss. I assume that this means that the horse was not pulling strongly and neither was he "dragging his feet". In correspondence I asked the coroner if she was given access to the livestream video of the event but so far she has declined to answer. Obviously what is needed is a comparison between competitors and, as 50 horses had successfully completed the course at the time the competition was abandoned, there is a good dataset to establish if speed, either fast or slow, played any part in the accident.
It is also worth noting that the only comment on the combination's performance up until the time of the accident came from the rider's husband, himself a professional rider. Without a comparison with other riders I do not know if the Coroner would have been knowledgeable enough to make a judgement on riding style and I would have expected input from other expert witnesses to comment on the way the approach to the water had been ridden.
My recollection of watching Zazie's accident through the camera viewfinder was that I thought "blimey she's going fast" and the horse was fighting for control. So these things are quite noticeable if you are watching on the ground. A fence judge is quoted as saying that there was nothing to spook the horse so we have to assume that the absence of any other comment means that they were happy with the way the combination approached the obstacle.
We must remember that as flight animals horses are engineered to see things much differently to us. One thing that struck me from looking back to the Marcio accident was the number of cars around the water complex for the picnic parking. These would have filled Global Quest's vision as he turned to fence 5A.
Conclusion
For the reasons I have outlined the Coroner concluded that Georgie's death was an accident.
Accidents do happen and are a natural part of life. Even with planning, skill, and precautions, we can’t control everything. Complexity, human error, chance, and unpredictable environments mean that some level of risk always exists—whether it’s a dropped glass, a car crash, or a systems failure.
The direct cause was a rotational fall of the horse.
The apparent causes are:
The combinations approach to 5A which led to the horse needing to put in a short stride before 5B
The location of the water complex at Bicton which led to it being jumped early on in the 4 Star course
A desire to achieve an aesthetically pleasing "rustic" water complex with large timbers rather than a safer water complex with smaller timber and frangible devices
If I was pressed to identify a root cause I would have to suggest that the risk assessment process was in fact found wanting. I'm not sure if the Coroner identifying the process as "adequate" is in fact damming it with faint praise but with the wisdom of hindsight it does feel as if the risk cluster associated with this fence was not properly assessed or acted on.
In describing my safety case I spoke about the concept of zero harm and how it applied in practice. It is an aspiration, and when an accident or an incident occurs we need to learn from it and move forward.
There is some evidence that lessons have been learned from Georgie's accident and changes have been made. We have noindication that these lessons have been shared widely. Certainly there has been no public statement from British Eventing summarising what the accident means for the wider eventing community in the U.K.
When I wrote to the Coroner I told her that I seeking additional information in order to calibrate my safety case against where we currently are as an equestrian community. And when I wrote safety case claim 2, asserting that we enjoyed an open reporting culture leading to continuous improvement, I truly believed it. The first leg of the EEWB strategic approach talked about providing for informed public and equestrian discussion.
But to finish on a positive note (for me at least). Claim 5 states risks are known, mitigated, managed and weighed against societal benefits. The whole of the Coroner's finding are enshrined in this claim. The risks of society's involvement in elite eventing were known, had been reasonably mitigated and managed, such that the only conclusion the Coroner could draw was that this was a terrible, tragic accident.
David spent approaching 50 years in Her Majesty's Electricity Supply Industry before retiring
He was part of the highly successful design team on the Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station Project before spending 25 years producing safety cases to keep our aging AGR fleet generating for the good of the nation
He is responsible for the Harveywetdog YouTube Channel which he maintains as an outlet for his creative talents
David has twice experienced blood cancer treatment but absolutely refuses to be a victim
All views are of course his own but might be influenced by the medication he's had to take
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